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THE CASE FOR A PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION 
MICHAELP. SCHARF* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor 
at Nuremberg, said that one of the most important legacies of the in-
ternational war crimes trials following World War II would be the 
documentation of the Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in 
such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in 
the future and no tradition of mart)lrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise 
among iriformed people."1 Jackson said further that to establish an 
authoritative record of abuses to endure the test of time and withstand 
the challenge of revisionism, "we must establish incredible events by 
credible evidence. "2 
The international community has principally used two methods to 
establish the record of grave human rights crimes following an interna-
tional conflict or civil war: international prosecutions such as those 
conducted at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II, and more 
recently at The Hague, Netherlands, and in Arusha, Tanzania, follow-
ing the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; and commis-
sions of inquiry, now commonly referred to as "truth commissions," 
which investigate situations and submit reports of their findings but 
have no power to impose criminal fines or sentences.3 
Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Policy, New 
England School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. De-
partment of State, 1989-1993. J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1988; A.B., Duke Univer-
sity, 1985. The author thanks the Dean and Board of Trustees of the New England School of 
Law for supporting the writing of this Article with a James R. Lawton Research Grant. 
1. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the 
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, Oct. 7, 1946 (on file with the Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law). 
2. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the 
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945). 
3. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative 
Study, in 1 TRANSmONAL JUSTICE: HOW El\4ERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER 
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While the United Nations has recognized the need for a perma-
nent international criminal court to supplant the current ad hoc ap-
proach,4 until now, no one has made a similar proposal for a permanent 
truth commission. Although there are some advantages to the flexibil-
ity that an ad hoc approach provides, the truth commissions that have 
been established thus far have been plagued by a host of problems. 
Most of the truth commissions have been woefully underfunded. They 
have also been vulnerable to politically imposed limitations and ma-
nipulation: Their structure, mandate, resources, access to information, 
willingness or ability to take on sensitive cases, and strength of final re-
p~ort have been largely' determined by the political forces at play in 
their creation. In addition, most have lacked the power to impose 
sanctions on perpetrators or provide compensation to victims, have not 
provided those named as perpetrators with the basic ·rights available to 
a criminal defendant, and have lacked the transparency necessary for a 
credible proceeding. These problems could be avoided by the creation 
of a permanent institution. 
This Article presents the case for the establishment of a perma-
nent international truth commission as an adjunct to a permanent in-
ternational criminal court or domestic prosecutions. Such a commis-
sion would be available to countries in the aftermath of situations 
involving grave humanitarian or human rights crimes. From the expe-
rience of the several international and national truth commissions es-
tablished to date, this Article seeks to distill a framework for a pro-
posed permanent international truth commission which would avoid 
the major problems that afflicted its predecessors. A draft statute for a 
permanent international truth commission is appended at the end of 
the Article with the hope that it will serve as a launching point for fu-
ture consideration. 
REGIMES 225, 225-26 (N. Kritz ed., 1995). 
4. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth Session, 
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 258, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993) (proposing a Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal). See generally James Crawford, The ILC's Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 140, 140-42 (1994). In 1995, 
the General Assembly voted to establish a preparatory committee to revise the International 
Law Commission's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court and prepare a widely ac-
ceptable consolidated text for adoption at a conference of plenipotentiaries in 1997 or 1998. 
Italy has offered to host the conference. For a discussion of the debate leading to the adoption 
of this resolution, see Virginia Morris & Christianne Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the 
Sixth Committee at the Fiftieth Session of the UN General Assembly, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 491, 496 
(1996). 
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II. THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
TRUTH COMMISSION 
A. A Brief History of Truth Commissions 
377 
The first international truth commission in modern times was es-
tablished by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to inves-
tigate alleged atrocities committed against civilians and prisoners of 
war during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.5 After World War I, the 
Allies created the 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, which investi-
gated German and Turkish atrocities committed during the war.6 
During World War II, the Allies established the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission to investigate German war crimes,7 and the Far 
Eastern Commission to investigate Japanese war crimes.8 In 1978, the 
parties to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 set 
up an International Fact-Finding Commission to investigate serious 
violations of the Geneva Conventions.9 During the 1990s, the interna-
tional community via the United Nations established truth commis-
sions for El Salvador,10 Guatemala/1 Somalia,12 the Former Yugosla-
5. See generally Report of the International Commission to Inquire Into the Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, reprinted in THE OTHER BALKAN WARS (Carnegie Endowment 
for Int'l Peace, 1993). 
6. See generally PAMPHLET No. 32, DIVISION OF INT'L LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'LL. 95-154 (1920). 
7. See U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 443-50 (1948). 
8. See Summary Statement by the Secretary-General: Apprehension, Trial and Punishment 
of War Criminals in the Far East, 16DEP'T ST. BULL. 799,804-06 (1947). 
9. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 90, 
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16I.L.M. 1391, 1429-31 (1977) [hereinafter Ad-
ditional Protocol I]. The seldom-used International Fact-Finding Commission has had limited 
utility since it is available only in international armed conflicts and only in situations in which 
the combatant countries have declared their recognition of the competence of the commission. 
See THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFL!Cf 342-44, 378-80 (Antonio Cassese 
ed., 1979). 
10. See generally Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador: From Madness to 
Hope, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annexes, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993) [hereinafter El Salvador 
Commission Report]. 
11. See Accord on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Human Rights Viola-
tions and Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer, Signed in 
Oslo, Norway 23 June 1994, U.N. Doc A/48/954-S/1994/1751, 1 July 1994, reprinted in 3 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 
220 (N. Kritz ed., 1995). Under the Accord, the U.N. moderator for the peace negotiations 
serves as one of three members of the Guatemala Truth Commission and will name the other 
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via,13 and Rwanda.14 The United Nations is currently considering a 
proposal to establish another such coffil-nission to document the abuses 
of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.15 Moreover, in the past ten years, a 
dozen states have set up their own domestic truth commissions to 
document atrocities within their borders and facilitate national recon-
ciliation.16 
In some cases, as in Argentina, the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, truth commissions have functioned as a first step toward, and 
as a supplement to, national or international prosecutions.17 In others, 
such as in El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Guatemala, and South ALrica, 
the truth commissions served as a substitute for prosecutions, and were 
accompanied by de jure18 or de facto19 amnesties for the perpetrators. 
two Guatemalan members with the agreement of the parties. See Margaret Popkin & Naomi 
Font-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America, 1 TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 262, 267-68. 
12. See generally Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 885 (I993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel which 
led to Casualties Among Them, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (1994) 
[hereinafter Somalia Commission Report]. 
13. See generally Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to SeCll-
rity Cozmcii Resoiution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) 
[hereinafter Yugoslavia Commission Report). 
14. See generally Final Report of the Commission of Experrs Established Pursuant to Secu-
rity Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994) 
[hereinafter Rwanda Commission Report). 
15. See Leo Dobbs, U.N. Official Calls for Cambodian Truth Commission, Reuters News, 
Feb. 6, 1997 (reporting call for a truth commission by U.N. Special Representative on Human 
Rights for Cambodia). 
16. See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Com-
parative Study, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 225-61 (discussing the establish-
ment of truth commissions in Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, and Uruguay). 
17. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1'1'13) 
(establishing Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d 
mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal). After the pub-
lication of the Argentinean Truth Commission's report, the government of President Raul Al-
fonsin undertook to prosecute members of the military responsible for some 9,000 disappear-
ances of civilians. However, when the military rebelled, Alfonsin's successor as president, 
Carlos Saul Men em, pardoned the junta leaders and called off the prosecutions. See Tina Ro-
senberg, Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship, 74 FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1995, at 134, 
146, 149. 
18. A few days after the publication of the El Salvador Truth Commission's report, the 
government of El Salvador enacted an across-the-board amnesty for all individuals identified in 
the report as responsible for serious acts of violence. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United 
Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 497,537 (1994). 
Pursuant to an agreement between the Aristide Government arid the de facto military 
leaders negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations, the Haitian parliament enacted an 
amnesty for the members of the military regime who had committed widespread human rights 
crimes. At the same time, Haiti established a seven-member truth commission to investigate 
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B. The Function of a Truth Commission 
Truth commissions serve four primary purposes: (1) to establish 
an historic record; (2) to obtain justice for the victims; (3) to facilitate 
national reconciliation; and (4) to deter further violations and abuses. 
Creating a credible account of human rights crimes "prevents history 
from being lost or rewritten, and allows a society to learn from its past 
in order to prevent a repetition of such violence in the future." 20 Jus-
tice is promoted by imposing moral condemnation and laying the 
groundwork for other sanctions. National reconciliation and individual 
rehabilitation are facilitated by acknowledging the suffering of victims 
and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing vic-
tims to tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire 
country, and imparting to the citizenry a sense of dignity and empow-
erment that could help them move beyond the pah1 of the past.21 Fur-
ther violations are deterred with specific recommendations for re-
form,22 which can provide pressure points around which the civilian 
society or the international community can lobby for change in the fu-
ture.23 
and document the human rights crimes committed in Haiti during Aristide's exile. See Michael 
P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty For Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in 
Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'LL.J. 1,17-18 (1996). 
19. After the submission of the Somalia Commission report identifying warlord Mohamed 
Farrah Aidid as responsible for the murder of 24 U.N. peacekeeping troops in 1993, the Secu-
rity Council passed a resolution authorizing Aidid's "arrest, and detention for prosecution, trial 
and punishment." S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. 
S/INF/49 (1993). Later, the Council rescinded this order in an effort "to foster political dia-
logue which can lead to national reconciliation." Statement of Ambassador Albright, U.N. 
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3315th mtg. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3315 (1993); S.C. Res. 885, U.N. SCOR, 
48th Sess., 3315th mtg. at 86, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993). 
20. Hayner, supra note 3, at 225-62. 
21. Studies of torture victims suggest that "production of a written document systematizing 
and summarizing their experiences was therapeutic because it helped the victims 'integrate the 
traumatic experience into their lives by identifying its significance in the context of political and 
social events as well as the context of their personal history."' NAOMI ROHT~ARRIAZA, 
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 19 (1995). In addi-
tion, psychologists have found that the process of producing testimony about the traumatic 
events before an investigative body can chamiel victinls' anger into a socially constructive ac-
tion and provides a form of catharsis. See id. 
22. Past commission reports have included recommendations covering military and police 
reform, as well as strengthening of democratic institutions, measures to promote national rec-
onciliation, or reform of the judicial system. See, e.g., Chad: Report of the Commission of In-
quiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre, His Accom-
plices and/or Accessories, May 7, 1992, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 
51, 92; Chile: Report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, February 9, 1991, 
reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JusTICE, supra note 11, at 105, 152-166; El Salvador Commission 
Report, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 177, 204-215. 
23. See generally Hayner, supra note 3. 
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In addition to these four primary purposes, truth com..m.issions can 
also serve other seconda.ry functions related to criminal prosecutions. 
Truth commissions can be an important precursor to judicial action, 
working as an intermediate step for states not yet ready to endorse full-
scale prosecutions. As the commissions for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda illustrate, the authoritative report of a commission can help 
muster the political will necessary for taking the next step toward 
bringing perpetrators to justice.24 The work of the truth commissions 
also provided the basis for early indictments once the United Nations 
had decided to opt for international prosecutions.25 Deterrence might 
be established through effective, selective prosecutions to demonstrate 
that abuses are subject to punishment and offenders subject to the rule 
of law, but such prosecutions would focus only on individual liability 
and thus fail to tell the whole story of abuses. A truth coiP..JTIJssion can 
supplement prosecutions by establishing a more complete historical re-
cord of abuses, victims, and perpetrators. Such a record would be use-
ful especially where the sheer number of perpetrators, such as in 
Rwanda where over 100,000 Hutus participated in the killing of a half 
million Tutsis,26 would render individual prosecution alone an insuffi-
cient response. And, by collecting and preserving evidence and testi-
mony, a truth comJnission can help ensure that LTJ cases vvhere it may be 
necessary to defer prosecutions to promote an end to hostilities,27 jus-
tice is merely postponed, not sacrificed altogetl1er. 
C. The Advantages of a Permanent International Institution 
There are four advantages to establishing a permanent interna-
tional body rather than relying on ad hoc national truth commissions: 
(1) superior sufficiency of funding; (2) a greater perception of neutral-
ity; (3) less susceptibility to domestic iP.fluences; and ( 4) greater speed 
in launching investigations. Each is discussed in turn below. 
First, individual states recovering from an international conflict or 
civil war nonnally lack the financial resources to carPJ out a compre-
24. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 17; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 17. 
25. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the For-
mer Yugoslavia, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 2 (International Human Rights Law Institute, 
DePaul University College of Law, 1996), at 68. 
26. See 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at xxi. 
27. The experiences of Uruguay and Argentina suggest that aggressive efforts to prosecute 
members of a former regime may induce attempts to overthrow the incipient democratic gov-
ernment. See Dianne F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Former Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2545 (1991). 
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hensive investigation. The Bolivian and Philippine truth commissions 
lacked sufficient resources to complete their work, the Chadian truth 
commission was paralyzed for months by lack of funds, and the ongo-
ing Ugandan commission has had to halt its work on several occasions 
due to a shortage of cash.28 An international truth commission, in con-
trast, is more likely to have stable and adequate funding. For example, 
El Salvador's U.N.-sponsored commission enjoyed ample funding of 
about $2.5 million,29 and the U.N.'s Commission for the Former Yugo-
slavia received $500,000 from the United Nations and an additional 
$1.3 million in contributions from thirteen states and private founda-
tions.30 
Second, an international truth commission can guarantee neutral-
ity in a highly polarized environment. Many of the past national truth 
commissions have been accused of partisanship, having commissioners 
politically beholden to the current administration, or being unabash-
edly pro-government or regionally biased.31 To be perceived as fair, a 
truth commission should establish its independence from all the actors 
in a contested history. It must have the moral authority to examine 
and judge the acts and motivations of others. A geographically diverse 
international truth commission is much more likely to be perceived as 
objective and disinterested than a national truth commJssion.32 Moreo-
ver, there would be a greater sense of legitimacy derived from the in-
ternational community's involvement, as well as greater i.11temational 
attention to the work of such an institution, thus increasing pressure for 
the parties within the country to cooperate with the Commission's 
work and implement its recommendations. 
Third, an international body would operate in a more secure envi-
ronment and have access to greater security measures, which would fa-
cilitate the smooth and safe operation of the commission. The truth 
commission for El Salvador, for example, included permanent U.N. 
diplomatic security personnel assigned to protect the commissioners 
and the office.33 The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
28. See Hayner, supra note 3, at 232-36. 
29. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN 
INST. Q. 69, 89 (1993). 
30. See Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 9 n.24. 
31. See generally Hayner, supra note 3. 
32. However, it is important that a commission retain staff who are familiar with the cul-
ture, history, and politics of the country under investigation. Otherwise, the commission may 
encounter difficulties in perceiving the relative importance of certain cases, as well as the con-
sequences of their decisions and recommendations. 
33. See Hayner, supra note 3, at 250. 
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provided protection to the on-site investigations and mass-grave exhu-
mations undertaken in Croatia and Bosnia by the comnrission of ex-
perts established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 780.34 Moreo-
ver, an international commission would be less likely to be influenced 
by forces within the counLry and \Vould be less susceptible to fear of re-
prisal. Commissioners who are outsiders are more likely to ask hard 
questions and push to get information in a way that would be difficult 
for those closer to the conflict. 
Fourth, the existence of a permanent body with a flexible man-
date would ensure a more rapid investigation. A recurring problem of 
past truth corr1 . ~.rnissions has been the delay bervveen their establisl11'Tient 
and the initiation of investigations. It took over eighteen months for 
the commission of experts established by U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 780 to initiate L"'lvestigative missions in the ·territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia.35 Just as it is often said that justice delayed is justice 
denied, so too can delays affect the efficacy of the search for truth. 
With time, memories fade and evidence disappears. The creation of a 
permanent commission would avoid ihe time consu_ming process of ap-
pointing commissioners, approving a budget, drawing up internal rules, 
and hiring a staff, thereby enabling the commission to proceed imme-
diately with its investigation. 
D. The Proposed Structure and Jurisdiction of a Permane11t Truth 
Commission 
As envisaged in the appended Draft Statute, a permanent interna-
tional truth commission could be established in the same manner as a 
permanent international criminal court-by a treaty open to all inter-
ested states. No more than a small number of commissioners would be 
necessary, provided the corr.~.n:rission is equipped with adequate admin-
istrative staff for its workload, including lavl';ers, analysts, interpreters, 
secretaries, security personnel, and investigators.36 To ensure geo-
graphic diversity, the commissioners would be elected by an absolute 
majority vote of the state parties, with a caveat that no two commis-
sioners may be nationals of the same state.37 Moreover, provision 
would be made for recusal or disqualification of commissioners i11 
34. See Yugoslavia Commission Report, supra note 13, paras. 36,271-73. 
35. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994). 
36. See Appendix, infra, art. 5. 
37. See id. art. 6. 
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situations in which their impartiality might be in doubt.38 To keep costs 
down, between investigations commissioners and staff could be paid a 
prorated salary "on an as when actually employed basis. "39 
A precedent for this approach would be the International Fact-
Finding Coilllilission created by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. That body has had limited utility because it is 
only available in international armed conflicts and only in situations in 
which the combatant countries have declared their recognition of its 
competence.40 In contrast, the jurisdiction of the proposed permanent 
truth commission would include the following: 
(a) the crime of genocide;41 
(b) serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in both in-
ternational and internal armed conflicts;42 and 
(c) crimes against humanity,43 including enforced disappearances,44 
. e a 
extra-legal executiOns and acts of torture. 
38. See id. art. 9. 
39. Jd. art. 12. The Rwanda Tribunal employed this cost-saving measure with respect to 
its judges prior to the commencement of trials. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Ad-
ministrative and Budgetary Questions; U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 3, U.N. 
Doc. A/501923 (1996). 
40. See Additional Protocol I, art. 90, supra note 9. 
41. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
42. See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members ofthe Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Tjme of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Additional Protocol I, supra 
note 9; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 
Dec. 12 1977, reprinted in 16 l.L.M. 1442. 
43 To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts must be inhumane in character; wide-
spread or systematic; directed against a civilian population; and committed on national, politi-
cal, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 32; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 248-50 (1992). 
44. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearances, G.A. 
Res. 47/133, in UNITED NATIONS, PRESS RELEASE, RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED 
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING THE FIRST PART OF ITS FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION, U.N. 
Doc. GA/8470 (1992). 
45. See Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions, annexed to UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 
RESOLUTION 1989/65: EFFECflVE PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION OF EXTRA-LEGAL, 
ARBITRARY AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS (1989). 
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The coiDmission's jurisdiction over such acts would be triggered by a 
request from the U.N. Security Council or a majority of state parties to 
the statute.47 In so doing, the requesting entity would designate the 
dates and geographic location wbich are to be the subject of the com-
mission's investigation. 
To ensure a balanced treatment of parties involved in the investi-
gation, unlike some of the past truth commissions,48 the proposed 
commission would investigate the acts of all sides to a conflict, includ-
ing both government-initiated or sponsored violations and acts com-
mitted by opponents of the ruli.."'lg regit'Tie. The corruTiission could also 
investigate the role of international actors (usually foreign govern-
ments), who may be involved in the funding, arming, trainii1g or other-
wise assistin.g those responsible for serious human rights cruues. 
For each situation the commission would be given twelve months 
to complete its investigation and submit a report.49 The expenses of the 
commission would be borne by the parties to its statute, or, in any case 
referred to the commission by the Security Council, by the United Na-
tions.50 In addition, the commission would be authorized to accept vol-
untary contributions from interested states, including funds, materials, 
<:lnril ~o':"'L'.n.nro-1 51 
U..!L..lU. J.-'V.!. L>V~ !l..-1. 
III. ADDRESSING THE DEFICIENCIES OF PAST TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS 
A. Rights of the Accused 
To create an authoritative history, a truth commission's work must 
be detailed enough to convince skeptics that the facts it finds are true, 
while at the same time providing overall patterns and explanations to 
shape historical accounts of the atrocities. Creating such a history re-
quires naming persons responsible for human rights crimes when there 
46. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 LL.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1984) 
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
47. In many cases, this request would be in response to the request of a new regime. 
48. See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Trwh as Justice: Investigatory Commis-
sions in Latin America, 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 262, 273. 
49. See Appendix, infra, art. 16. 
50. See id. art. 12. 
51. See id. 
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is compelling evidence of their culpability. While public identification 
is not a penalty per se, it can adversely effect the reputation, career and 
political prospects of individuals. For this reason, most of the truth 
commissions to date have avoided naming names so as not to violate 
the due process rights of such individuals. As Jose Zalaquett, a Com-
missioner on the Chilean Truth Commission, explained: 
To name culprits who had not defended themselves and were not 
obliged to do so would have been the moral equivalent to convict-
ing someone without due process. This would have been in contra-
diction with the wrrit, if not the letter, of the rule of law and human 
rights principles. 
The El Salvador commission of 1992 was the first truth commis-
sion to publicly identify persons responsible for violations. It identified 
some forty-odd officials, including the minister of defense and the 
president of the supreme court. In the introductory chapter to its re-
port, the El Salvador commission explained its rationale: 
It could be argued that, since the Commission's investigation meth-
odology does not meet the normal requirements of due process, the 
report should not name the people whom the Commission consid-
ers to be implicated in specific acts of violence. The Commission 
believes that it had no alternative but to do so. 
In the peace agreements, the Parties made it quite clear that it was 
necessary that the "complete truth be made known," and that was 
why the Commission was established. Now, the whole truth cannot 
be told without naming names. After all, the Commission was not 
asked to write an academic report on El Salvador, it was asked to 
describe exceptionally important acts of violence and to recom-
mend measures to prevent the repetition of such acts. This task 
cannot be performed in the abstract, suppressing informa-
tion ... where there is reliable testimony available, especially when 
the persons identified occupy senior positions and perform official 
functions directly related to violations or the cover-up of violations. 
Not to name names would be to reinforce the very impunity to 
which the Parties instructed the Commission to put an end.53 
While the El Salvador commission identified certain iildividuals as 
culprits and recommended administrative sanctions, it did so without 
52. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECON-
CILIATION xxxii (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993). 
53. El Salvador Commission Report, supra note 10, at 25. 
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according those identified an opportunity to confront their accusers.54 
A critic of such a one-sided process asked, "What is the quality of the 
truth that is established? Will one be forced to make negative com-
parisons between the Commission's truth and judicial truth or histori-
cal truth?"55 
When this issue arose with respect to the recently established 
South Africa Truth Commission, the South African Supreme Court 
ruled that the commission must provide persons "proper, reasonable 
and time[ly] notice" of hearings if evidence detrimentally implicating 
them is to be heard.56 Similarly, the statute of the Uganda Truth 
Commission contains a provision which states that "any one who in the 
opinion of the Commissioners- is adversely affected by the evidence 
given before the Commission shall be given an opportunity to be heard 
and to cross-examine the person giving such evidence."57 This provi-
sion of basic due process rights is a positive development, which should 
be included in the statute of a permanent international truth commis-
sion.58 The credibility of truth commissions would be enhanced im-
measurably by following this example and allowing persons who are 
implicated in their investigation to appear in person, or through a rep-
resentative, to present their side of the story and to confront their ac-
cusers. 
54. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN 
INST. Q. 69, 69 (1993). The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed the importance of the right of 
the accused to confront the witnesses against him or her as follows: "Face-to-face confronta-
tion generally serves to enhance the accuracy of fact-finding by reducing the risk that a witness 
will wrongfully implicate an innocent person." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 
55. Anton Ferreira, South Africa's Road to Healing Paved with Problems, REUTERS, Apr. 
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. 
56. South Africa Truth Commission Seeks Clarification of Accused Rights, AFRICA NEWS 
SERV., May 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. While this ruling was 
later reversed, the South African Truth Commission nonetheless decided to adopt the recom-
mended procedure. See Alexander Boraine, Alternatives and Adjuncts to Criminal Prosecu-
tions, Remarks at the Justice in Cataclysm Conference, Brussels, Belgium, July 20-21, 1996, at 
5 (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law). 
57. The Commissions of Inquiry Act, Legal Notice No. 5 (May 16, 1986) (Cap. 56), re-
printed in 3 TRANSillONALJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 255-57. 
58. See Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Ac-
tion to Combat Impunity, Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Violations of Human 
Rights: Final Report Prepared by Mr. L. Joinet Pursuant to Subcommission Resolution 1995135, 
Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (1996) 
(recommending that "the person implicated shall have the opportunity to make a statement 
setting out his or her version of the facts or, within the time prescribed by the instrument estab-
lishing the commission, to submit a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in the 
file."). 
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B. Transparency 
Most of the truth commissions have operated privately, only re-
leasing a final report to the public,59 out of concern that "public investi-
gations risk scaring away witnesses that otherwise might testify, or put-
ting in danger those that do."60 However, such closed proceedings have 
undermined the integrity of the process, for it is human nature that 
people do not trust what they cannot see. In this way, past truth com-
missions have been susceptible to the criticisms levied on the infamous 
"Star Chamber" of seventeenth century England.61 As the U.S. Su-
preme Court observed in a related context, "[t]o work effectively, it is 
important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice, and the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing 
people to observe it."62 
The South African Truth Commission has recognized the value of 
conducting its work in a manner that allows public observation. Ac-
cording to Dr. Alexander Boraine, the Vice Chairperson of the Com-
mission, "There is the enormous advantage of the nation participating 
in the hearings and the work of the Commission from the very begin-
ning through radio, television and the print media and the right of any-
one to attend any of the hearings," which, he concludes, provides a 
"strong educative opportunity so that healing and reconciliation is not 
confined to a small group but is available to all."63 In a similar vein, 
Richard Goldstone, the Chief Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War 
Crimes Tribunal, said that "people don't relate to statistics, to generali-
zations. People can only relate and feel when they hear somebody that 
59. Prior to the South African Truth Commission, the only partial exception to this trend 
was the Argentinean Truth Commission, which, upon completion of its work in private, pro-
duced a two-hour synopsis of the testimony taken by the commission shown on national televi-
sion. See Hayner, supra note 3, at 232. 
60. !d. at 254. 
61. The Court of Star Chamber was controlled by the monarch and was so named because 
its seat was in the royal palace of Westminster in a room with stars painted on the ceiling. In 
the seventeenth century, the court was used by sovereigns James I and Charles I to suppress 
opposition to their authority. The court met in secret and dealt out excessive and cruel pun-
ishment. The Star Chamber was finally abolished in 1641. For a history of the Star Chamber, 
see G.R. ELTON, STAR CHAMBER STORIES (1958); JOHN A. GUY, THE CARriJNAL'S COURT: 
THE IMPACT OF THOMAS WOLSEY IN STAR CHAMBER (1977); WILLIAM HUDSON, A 
TREATISE OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (Francis Hargrave ed., 1986). 
62. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980); see also Joint Anti-
fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
("[F]aimess can rarely be obtained by secret one-sided determinations of facts decisive of 
rights."). 
63. See Boraine, supra note 56, at 5. 
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they can identify with telling what happened to them. That's why the 
public broadcasts of the proceedings can have a strong healing and de-
terrent effect. "64 
While there are complications and risks attendant to open pro-
ceedings,65 these can be addressed in less draconian ways than by com-
pletely closing the proceedings to the public and press. For guidance in 
this regard, one has only to turn to the recent experience of the Yugo-
slavia War Crimes Tribunal, which has developed an innovative pro-
ceeding similar to a "mini" truth commission, known as a Rule 61 
hearing. When the prosecution has been unable to secure the presence 
of the accused for a full blown trial, the Rule 61 hearing allows the 
prosecutor to present its case to the Tribunal in a public, televised pro-
ceeding.66 To protect rape victims and other witnesses from possible 
danger, the Tribunal employs a variety of means such as expunging 
names and identifying information from public records, giving of testi-
mony through image- and voice-altering devices or closed circuit tele-
vision, and assigning pseudonyms.67 The use of such protective meas-
ures would allow a truth commission both to protect witnesses and to 
avail itself of the benefits of a public proceeding. 
C. Victim Compensation 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the 
Torture Convention all recognize the right of victims of human rights 
abuses to receive compensation for their injury.68 Compensable inju-
ries include loss of life, physical or psychological injury, loss of liberty, 
Joss of or da_mage to property, loss of opportunity, and other injuries 
64. Interview with Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War Crimes 
Tribunal, in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996) (on file with author). 
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
66. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Rule 61, 
reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 66 (1995). 
67. See id. Rule 75. 
68. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and 
Victim Compemation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 425, 448-49 
(Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Study Concerning the Right ro Restitu-
tion, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Thea van Boven, Special Rapporteur, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10 (1990), reprinted in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, 
at 505, 515. 
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proximately caused by the abuses.69 Compensation can either be 
monetary or in the form of non-monetary reparation such as provision 
of new employment, pension rights, medical and educational services, 
social security, and housing.70 A truth commission can play an impor-
tant role in the provision of such compensation. 
The most obvious method of obtaining victim compensation is for 
the injured party, or their next of kin, to bring suit in the courts of the 
state involved. However, victims of human rights abuses often do not 
know the identity of those who perpetrated the abuses against them. 
Even when the identity of the persecutors is known, the victims fre-
quently lack evidence of the persecutors' participation, as there are 
rarely written records of abuses and witnesses are generally reluctant 
to come forward. A truth commission could assist in the attainment of 
compensation through the judicial process by transmitting to the com-
petent judicial authorities the commission's findings that a victim has 
suffered injury due to the acts of a specific individual or governmental 
entity. Yet, even with the findings of a truth commission, there are 
likely to be other obstacles to obtaining victim compensation through 
domestic courts: The individuals directly responsible frequently lack 
sufficient resources for adequate compensation; amnesties often extin-
guish the possibility of civil compensation;71 and the limitations of na-
tional law often deprive victims of any cause of action.72 
Some countries, such as the United States, have opened their 
courts to foreign citizens wishing to bring suit for human rights abuses 
committed in a foreign country. The Alien Tort Claims Act provides 
the U.S. courts with jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States,"73 and the recently enacted Torture Victim Protection 
Act provides a private right of action against "an individual who, under 
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation," 
69. Ellen L. Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims of Human Rights Abuses, in 1 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 551,559. 
70. Theo van Boven et al., Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Reha-
bilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Sum-
mary and Conclusions, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 500. 
71. The week after the El Salvador Truth Commission report was published, the El Salva-
dor legislature adopted an amnesty law that provided for the extinction of civil as well as crimi-
nal responsibility. See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory 
Commissions in Latin America, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 262, 283. 
72. See Orentlicher, supra note 68, at 458. 
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 1993). 
390 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:375 
subjects another individual to "torture" or to "extrajudicial killi11g."74 
If hurdles such as Foreign Sovereign Immunity/5 the Act of State Doc-
trine/6 and the Political Question Doctrine77 can be overcome, a plain-
tiff armed with the findings of an international truth commission that 
the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's injuries is likely to 
achieve success on the merits.78 UnfortU11ately, such suits ordinarily 
represent little more than symbolic justice, as few of the defendants 
would have assets in the United States that could be attached in execu-
tion of the judgment.79 
Another scheme for victim compensation would involve the pay-
ment of compensation by the government, rather than by the individ-
ual perpetrators. VVhen, as is usually the case, the offender is a gov-
ernment authority or a private person actii"lg as the agent of a 
government, it should be the duty of the state itself to redress the in-
jury.80 Under the broad international law principles of state responsi-
74. ld. 
75. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976,28 U.S.C. § 1602.(1994), a foreign 
official or agent cannot be sued in the United States for tortious conduct abroad. See Argen-
tine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433-39 (1989); Saudi Arabia v. 
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1474 (1993). 
76. Under the Act of State doctrine, a U.S. court will not question the validity of the offi-
cial acts of a foreign government done within its own country. Compare Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (holding that unlawful detention by a foreign militar-y com-
mander was a nonreviewable act of state), with Fiiartiga v. Peiia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (holding that unauthorized torture by a state official, in violation of the law of the 
foreign state, might not properly be characterized as an act of state), and Sharon v. Time, Inc., 
599 F. Supp. 538, 544-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the alleged unauthorized approval of a 
massacre by a general is not an act of state). 
is: 
77. Under the political question doctrine, a U.S. court will not decide an issue where there 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question. 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Compare Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 
1452, 1457 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that suit against Contras for the wrongful death of U.S. 
citizen in Nicaragua presented a nonjusticiable political question), with Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. 
Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that determining liability for a ter-
rorist act on a cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea did not implicate the political question doc-
trine). 
78. Cf Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 n.10 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the defendant's 
acts are "being investigated by a United Nations Commission of Experts."). 
79. See Taking Tyrants to Court, AM. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 56. 
80. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Compensating Victims of the Crimes of War, 12 VA. J. INT'L 
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bility, the state is also responsible for failing to prevent or respond 
adequately to human rights violations in its territory committed by 
purely private parties or agents of a foreign government.81 In accor-
dance with the "principle of the continuity of the State in international 
law," the duty of the state to pay compensation applies even to a new 
government that has replaced the government responsible for the 
abuses.82 Recognizing this principle, after World War II the Federal 
Republic of Germany provided individual compensation amounting to 
over $10 billion to over three million victims of Nazi persecution.83 
More recently, Albania,84 Bulgaria,85 Czechoslovakia,86 and Russia87 
have enacted laws providing compensation and other relief to the vic-
tims of politieal repression under their former totalitarian govern-
ments. 
Unfortunately, very few other states have ever voluntarily agreed 
to pay compensation to the victims of a prior regime.88 There is prece-
dent, however, for an outside entity to compel a government to pay vic-
tim compensation. For example, the European Court of Human 
Rights has ordered governments to pay compensation to victims of 
L. 343, 344 (1972); Organization of American States, Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Valasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C No. 4, reprinted in 3 TRAN-
smONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 586, 588. 
81. See Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, Thea van Boven, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10, July 
26, 1990, reprinted in 1 TRANSITIONALJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 505, 518. 
82 Organization of American States, Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Valasquez 
Rodriguez Case, supra note 80, at 586, 590. In the Valasquez Rodriguez case, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights held the new Honduran government responsible for com-
pensating the victims of human rights abuses perpetrated by the prior regime. See id. 
83. See Ferencz, supra note 80, at 353; Kurt Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims 
of Nazi Persecution, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 479, 489-520 (1972). 
84. Albania: Law on Former Victims of Persecution, Law No. 7748, July 29, 1993, re-
printed in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 661-66. 
85. Bulgaria: Law on Political and Civil Rehabilitation of Oppressed Persons, June 15, 
1991, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 672-74. 
86. Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, February 
21,1991, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 704-17. 
87. Law on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression, October 18, 1991, as 
amended December 17, 1992, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONALJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 797-805. 
88. By way of direct contrast to the German experience, one might look to the Japanese 
treatment of the so-called "comfort women." In August 1993, the Japanese government for-
mally acknowledged that during World War II the Imperial Army forced thousands of women, 
most of whom were Korean, into sexual slavery. Japan has not taken any steps to provide 
compensation to these victims or their families. See Orentlicher, supra note 68, at 458-59. 
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violations in well over one hundred cases.89 A few of the established 
domestic truth commissions have put pressure on the national govern-
ment to provide appropriate victim compensation. For example, the 
Chile Commission for Truth and Reconciliation recommended that the 
government award victims various social benefits, such as health care 
(both physical and psychological), and financial support for the educa-
tion of children of persons killed or missing.90 The El Salvador truth 
commission concluded that "justice does not stop at punishment; it also · 
demands reparation. The victims and, in most cases, their families, are 
entitled to moral and material compensation. "91 Its report called for a 
special fund to be established for this purpose, to be funded by the 
government, and lirged foreign_governments to allocate one percent of 
their aid to El Salvador to the fund as well.92 
In recommending foreign contributions, the El Salvador commis-
sion recognized a limitation to the approach of direct government 
compensation. After an internal or international conflict, depleted na-
tional resources often render significant financial compensation by a 
state responsible for massive violations an unlikely prospect. Some-
times, the authorities of the prior regime have spirited away large por-
tions of the government's assets to secret bank accounts abroad.93 Yet 
neither of these would be an insunnountable problem if the Security 
Council were to freeze the assets of the target county's government or 
of the members of the responsible regime.94 For example, on August 2, 
1991, the Security Council established a compensation commission to 
create a fund and oversee the payment of compensation for claims 
against Iraq "for any dire.ct loss, damage, including environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or any injury to foreign 
89. See id. at 454. 
90. See id. at 457. Thereafter, the Chilean Parliament enacted tlie Law Creating the Na-
tional Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, Law No. 19, 123 (January 31, 1992), re-
printed in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 685-95, to implement the recommenda-
tions contained in the Chile Truth Commission Report. 
91. El Salvador: Report of the Commission on Truth, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 11; at 177, 213. 
92. See id. 
93. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (effort by 
Philippine government to lay legal claim to millions of dollars worth of foreign assets and ac-
counts controlled by former President). 
94. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 
(1993) (freezing assets of the Haitian military regime and its principal supporters); S.C. Res. 
820, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993) (freezing assets of Ser-
bia-Montenegro); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 
(1990) (freezing assets of Iraq). 
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Governments' nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait."95 
A victim compensation fund from frozen assets was contemplated 
for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal. Although the statute of the 
Tribunal does not give it the power to award victim compensation, a 
clause was included in Security Council Resolution 827 (which ap-
proved the statute of the Tribunal), declaring that the creation of the 
Tribunal was without prejudice to the future establishment of a victim 
compensation program.96 However, the Security Council later unfroze 
the assets of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs,97 thereby ending any possi-
bility of such a program for the victims of ethnic cleansing in the Bal-
kans. 
Considering these experiences, this Article proposes a three-tiered 
compensation scheme for the permanent international truth commis-
sion. In the first tier, the commission would transmit to the competent 
authorities of the state(s) concerned its findings that a victim has suf-
fered injury because of the acts of a specific individual or governmental 
entity.98 Pursuant to relevant national legislation, a victim or persons 
claiming through him or her may bring an action in a national court or 
other competent body to obtain compensation.99 The second tier 
would involve the establishment of a victim's compensation fund for 
each situation under the commission's jurisdiction. Resources for the 
fund would be supplied by the government of the state in whose terri-
tory the violations were committed and by foreign governments, who 
would be urged to allocate a small percentage of their aid to that state 
for the victim compensation fund. 100 The third tier would be available 
in cases in which the assets of the responsible authorities have been 
frozen in accordance with a Security Council Resolution under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter.!Ol In those cases, states would 
95. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st rntg. '1118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). 
The Iraqi Compensation Commission has received over 2,335,000 claims submitted by 78 gov-
ernments on behalf of their citizens. Letter Dated 17 January 1994 From the President of the 
Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/107 (1994); see also John R. 
Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission-A New Structure to Enforce State Re-
sponsibility?, 87 AM. J. INT'LL.144 (1993). 
96. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
97. See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3700th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1074 
(1995). 
98. See Appendix, infra, art. 21, para. 2. 
99. See id. art. 21, para. 3. 
100. See id. art. 21, para. 2. 
101. See supra note 94. 
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be authmized to release such frozen assets to the victim compensation 
fund. The froz_en assets could also be released pursuant to domestic 
judicial awards for damages in favor of the victims of abuses against the 
responsible authorities.102 
D. Imposition of Sanctions 
While the very publicity of the truth about an ii1dividual's respon-
sibility for human rights crimes exposes the perpetrator to public ig-
nominy and is therefore a form of punishment, the iinposition of ad-
ministrative sanctions can have additional deterrent effects over both 
the whole of societ-y and the individual subject to the penalty. Those 
violators who hold political positions could be impeached or publicly 
censured, and those with administrative authority, such as judges, civil 
servants, soldiers, and police, could be removed, deu~oted, censured, or 
lose their pension rights or other benefits.103 As has been recognized in 
the context of the conflict in Bosnia, the barring of perpetrators of hu-
man rights crimes from holding influential public positions is an impor-
tant part of the transition from a repressive regime to democracy.104 
The idea of barring perpetrators from office was the rationale be-
hind the recommendations of the EI Salvador truth commission calling 
for the dismissal from the armed forces of those active military officers 
who had committed or covered up serious acts of violence. The com-
mission also called for the dismissal of those civilian government offi-
cials and members of the judiciary who committed or covered up seri-
ous acts of violence or failed to investigate them, and recommended 
that legislation be adopted barring all individuals found by the Com-
mission to have been implicated in serious acts of violence from hold-
ing any public office for at least ten years. 105 
It is critical that such sanctions not be impleHlented in a way that 
Lmposes collective guilt by association. The so-called lustration la\vs in 
Germany and the Czech Republic106 have been criticized because they 
102. See Appendix, infra, art. 21, para. 5. 
103. See Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, supra note 58, 
at 21-22. 
104. See Letter Dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Represemative of the United 
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-Genera/, U.N. Doc. 
A/501790, S/1995/999 (1995), at 4 (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), 63 (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
105. See Thomas Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 
VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 536 (1994). 
106. "Lustration is the disqualification and, where in office, the removal of certain catego-
ries of office-holders under the prior regime from certain private or public offices under the 
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purge people based on party membership or official position without 
evidence of any individual wrongdoing or responsibility for ordering, 
perpetrating, or significantly aiding in perpetrating serious human 
rights abuses.107 Procedural fairness and due process are especially im-
portant when collective guilt is imposed. Such a determination should 
be made on the basis of a more stringent standard, such as clear and 
convincing evidence, rather than preponderance of the evidence, the 
lesser standard used for awarding compensation. 
Moreover, lustration and other non-criminal penalties are not pos-
sible unless the government in question has agreed in advance to im-
plement the sanctions recommended by a truth commission, as El Sal-
vador had done.108 By virtue of ratifying the treaty establishing the 
permanent truth commission, parties would make such a pledge, and 
nonparties could agree to cooperate with the truth commission on an 
ad hoc basis. Thus, in the context of a negotiated end to a civil or in-
ternational conflict, it is important that international mediators press 
parties to agree to cooperate fully with a truth commission as part of 
the settlement. International verification of compliance With the ac-
cord should include an assessment of the degree to which the parties 
have implemented the recommendations of the truth commission. Fur-
ther, in. a case referred to the permanent truth com_mission by the 
United Nations Security Council, all states would be required to im-
plement the commission's prescriptions by virtue of their obligation 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.109 In this way, international 
pressure can substitute for political will in assuring that the recommen-
dations of a truth commission are fully carried out. 
This does not mean, however, that there is no value to a truth 
commission established in the absence of such a commitment from the 
new regime." Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, in 1 TRANSJTIONAL JUSTICE 
461, 461 (N. Kritz ed., 1995). 
107. See id. at 464. 
108. The parties to the El Salvador Peace Accords-the government and the FMLN-
agreed to be bound by the recommendations of the Truth commission. See Thomas Buergen-
thal, The United Nations Truth Commission Truth Commission in El Salvador, 27 V AND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 497, 533 (1994). The commission called for the dismissal from the Armed 
Forces of those active military officers who had committed serious acts of violence and dis-
missal from the government and judiciary of those persons who committed or cover up serious 
acts of violence or failed to investigate them. See id. at 536. 
109. Article 2(6) and Article 25 of the U.N. Charter establish the respective obligations of 
non-Member and Member States to comply with Security Council decisions made under Chap-
ter VII of the Charter. The obligation to comply with the prescriptions of the truth commission 
in a case referred to the commission by the Security Council would be analogous to the obliga-
tion of states to comply with the orders of the International Tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda. 
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govern1uent in question or action by the Security Council. Indeed, a 
govermnent's response can range from active opposition to total sup-
port of the work of a truth commission, with most cases falling some-
where in between. For exaiuple, a government might consent to allow 
the truth commission to conduct interviews in-country, but refuse to 
release government documents or provide other active assistance. Un-
der such circumstances, the truth commission might still be able to es-
tablish a record of victims and perpetrators of abuses. But pressure 
from foreign governments and international organizations is needed to 
obtain more ambitious results. 
E. The Granting of _A_mnesty 
Truth commissions have all too frequently been viewed as an al-
ternative to prosecutions because many have been accompa11ied by 
grants of amnesty to the major perpetrators of human rights crit-nes. 
For example, the same day that the Haitian parliament established a 
seven-member truth commission to investigate and document the hu-
man rights crimes con1mitted i.n Haiti duri_ng Aristide's exile, it enacted 
an amnesty for the members of the military regime responsible for 
these abuses. 11° Following the publication of the El Salvador truth 
cow&Jssion's report, El Salvador's gover11ment enacted an aw~esty 
preventing the prosecution of those named in the report.m Similarly, 
the South African truth commission itself is empowered to grant am-
nesty as an inducement for the giving of testimony before the com-
• • 112 ID1SS10n. 
Viewing truth commissions as a substitute for prosecutions causes 
two problems. First, in some situations, the granting of amnesty may 
be in violation of international legal instruments such as the 1949 Ge-
e . n3 1 G "d r . 114 h T C neva onventwns, tile JTenocL e vonvent10n, t e _ orture onven-
110. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 18. 
111. The week after the El Salvador truth commission report was published, the El Salva-
dor legislature adopted an amnesty law that provided for the extinction of civil as well as crimi-
nal responsibility. See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory 
Commissions in Latin America, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 262,283 (N. Kritz ed., 1995). 
112. Victims's Families Demand End to Amnesty for Human Rights Abusers, Agence 
France-Presse, May 30, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. The 
South African scheme avoids some of the problems associated with a general amnesty by (1) 
requiring that amnesty be applied for on an individual basis; (2) requiring applicants to make 
full disclosure of their human rights violations in a public proceeding; and (3) providing am-
nesty only for acts associated with a political objective and not for personal gain or out of per-
sonal malice. Remarks of Alexander Boraine, supra note 56. 
113. Parties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for, prosecute, and 
punish perpetrators of "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions unless they choose to hand 
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tion,115 and, in the case of South Africa, the Apartheid Convention,116 
which contain an absolute obligation to prosecute the crimes enumer-
ated therein.117 In addition, a blanket amnesty may violate general hu-
man rights conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights/18 the European Convention on Human Rights,119 
and the American Convention on Human RightS,120 which obligate 
states to "ensure" or "secure" the rights enumerated therein.121 As Ar-
ticle 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, "a 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for failure to perform a treaty."122 Second, even when amnesties do not 
run afoul of these treaties, 123 the creation of impunity through an am-
over such persons for trial by another state party. See The Geneva Convention For the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 
1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3148,75 U.N.T.S. 31, 64; The Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces 
at Sea, August 12, 1949, art. 52,6 U.S.T. 3217,3250,75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; The Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, art. 131, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
3420,75 U.N.T.S. 135, 238; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
son<; in Time of War, August 12,1949, art.148, 6 U.S.T. 3516,3618,75 U.N.T.S. 287,388. 
114. Article 4 of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or any of 
the acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsi-
ble rulers, public officials or private individuals." Article 5 requires states to "provide effective 
penalties" for persons guilty of genocide. Genocide Convention, supra note 41, at 280. 
115. The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of torture are 
offenses under its internal law, establish its jurisdiction over such offenses in cases where the 
alleged offender is a national of the state, and if such a state does not extradite the alleged of-
fender~ submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. See Torture 
Convention, supra note 46. 
116. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, which entered into force in July 1978 and to which 99 states were party on Decem-
ber 31, 1993, obligates states party to prosecute the crime defined therein. See Carla Edelen-
bos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 7 (1994). Al-
though South Africa is not a party, Nelson Mandela's African National Conference was one of 
the driving forces behind the creation of the Apartheid Convention and it is therefore morally, 
if not legally, committed to honor its mandate. 
117. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 1-42. 
118. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
119. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, signed Nov. 4,1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953,213 U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. No.5. 
120. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 91.L.M. 673. 
121. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 25-28. 
122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 
reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS 55 (1995). 
123. For example, the obligation to prosecute under the Geneva Conventions applies only 
to acts committed in international armed conflict, not to acts committed in a civil war. The ob-
ligation to prosecute the crime of genocide applies only to persecution of ethnic, national, ra-
cial, or religious groups, not to acts directed against political opponents. See supra notes 113, 
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nesty can have the effect of encouraging future violations of the law. 
The granting of such i..mpllility erodes the rule of law by blurring the 
norms of right and wrong and encourages the victims to resort to vigi-
lante justice; and, most worrisome of all, an amnesty that has the im-
primatur of the international community encourages a repetition of 
similar abuses by perpetrators throughout the world. 
While the deterrent value of prosecutions of international crimes 
may be subject to debate,124 the granting of amnesty has been shown 
empirically to foment future abuses. For example, history records that 
the international amnesty given to the Turkish officials responsible for 
the massacre of over one million Armenians during World War I en-
couraged Adolf Hitler some twenty years later to conclude that Ger-
many could pursue his genocidal policies with impun:ity. 125 Similarly, 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission has concluded that the granting 
of amnesties is one of the main reasons for the continuation of grave 
violations of human rights throughout the world.126 Recent fact-finding 
reports from Chile and El Salvador lend support to this conclusion. 127 
The evidence strongly suggests that the failure of the international 
community to prosecute Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, and Mo-
hammed Aidid, among others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their 
policy of etJ:l~nJc cleansing in the former Yugoslavia with the expecta-
tion that they would not be held accountable for their international 
• 128 
cnmes. 
114. 
124. Those who commit crimes under emotional stress (such as murder in the heat of an-
ger) or who have become expert criminals (such as professional safebreakers and pickpockets) 
are less likely than others to be deterred by the threat of criminal punishment. See J. 
ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 45-46 (1974). Grant Niemann, one of the prose-
cuiors of lhe :{ugosiavia War Criines Tribunal, told this author in an interview, "deterrence has 
a better chance of working with these kinds of crimes [war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity] than it does with ordinary domestic crimes because the people who commit these 
acts are not hardened criminals; they're politicians or leaders of the community that have up 
until now been law abiding people." Interview with Grant Niemann, Prosecutor, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in The Hague, Netherlands (July 25, 1996) (on 
file with author). 
125. Indeed, in a speech to his Commanding Generals, Hitler dismissed concerns about ac-
countability for acts of aggression and genocide by stating, "Who after all is today speaking 
about the destruction of the Armenians?" Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and 
Commanding Generals, Aug. 22, 1939, quoted in BASSIOUNI, supra note 43, at 176 n.96. 
126. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Report on the Consequences of Im-
punity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13, reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 
19. 
127. See Scharf, supra note 18, at 12 n.81. 
128. Interview with Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, in Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996) (on file with author). 
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Rather than condoning or endorsing such amnesties as a short-
term solution to international or internal conflicts, a more appropriate 
response would parallel official U.S. policy with respect to terrorism, 
which prohibits the government from "making concessions of any kind 
to terrorists" on the ground that "such actions would only lead to more 
terrorism."129 Thus, the preamble of the proposed statute for a perma-
nent international truth commission emphasizes that the commission is 
intended to be complementary to national and international prosecu-
tions, not a substitute for them.130 
This is not to suggest that a country should rush ahead with prose-
cutions at the cost of political instability and social upheaval or that 
every single perpetrator must be brought to justice-an admittedly im-
possible task in most countries that have experienced widespread hu-
manrights abuses.131 By documenting abuses and preserving evidence, 
a truth commission can enable a country to delay prosecutions until the 
international community has acted, or the new government is secure 
enough to take such action against members of the former regime.132 
129. U,S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988 at iii (1989). It is 
sometimes argued that leaders responsible for grave human rights crimes are "madmen," in-
fected by ethnic-nationalism and xenophobia, and as such, are unlikely to be deterred by the 
threat of criminal sanctions. There seems to be a close parallel between such individuals and 
terrorists, who are often willing to die for their cause. And yet, bas~d on the advice of leading 
experts in the fields of psychology, sociology, and psychiatry, the United States Government 
has concluded that the best way to deal with terrorists is to subject them to criminal prosecu-
tion. As Attorney-Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence and Counsel to the Counter-
Terrorism Bureau at the U.S. Department of State, this author participated in the formulation 
of this policy. 
130. See Appendix, infra, pmbl. 
131. In Rwanda, for example, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Rwandans par-
ticipated in the genocide of the Tutsis in 1994. See Gerald Gahima, Rwanda: The Challenge of 
Justice in the Aftermath of Genocide, (unpublished paper) (on file with author). For a discussion 
of the atrocities that took place in Rwanda, see Madeline Morris, Trials of Concurrent Jurisdic-
tion: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349 (1997). 
132. In the case of Rwanda, prior to the decision to establish an international criminal tri-
bunal, "a special investigations unit [under the auspices of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights] was established to gather evidence that might otherwise have been lost or de-
stroyed, to be turned over to the Prosecutor, if and when an international criminal court was 
brought into existence." Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Ac-
tivities of the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. W/CN.4/1996/111, April 2, 
1996, at para. 15. This investigative body, similar to a truth commission, took pains to ensure 
that the evidence it gathered could be used at trial. According to the Report of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, this investigatory unit 
carried out special investigations into acts of genocide, including a comprehensive 
survey by forensic experts of massacre and mass grave sites, interviews of surviving 
victims and witnesses and collection and preservation of documentary and other tan-
gible evidence . . . . While this work did not involve investigations for the direct pur-
pose of prosecutions, it nevertheless required the highest standards of confidentiality 
400 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:375 
International law recognizes the legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion, 
both in terms of the selection of defendants and the timing of prosecu-
tions, so long as the selection criteria are not arbitrary.133 Through 
eventual "exemplary" prosecutions, especially of the most culpable 
perpetrators and the leaders responsible for planning or supervising 
their abuses, together with the publication of a comprehensive truth 
commission report, authorities can educate the population about what 
the law is, deter future violations~ and ensure a sense of justice for the 
victims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After an international conflict or civil war in which grave human 
rights abuses have been committed, the truth must be told before there 
can be a successful reconciliation. Unfortunately, past truth commis-
sions, with their secret and one-sided deliberations, have not been able 
to produce as authoritative a record as can be generated in a public 
trial. Criminal prosecutions, however, which by their nature focus on 
individual liability, also fail to tell the whole story of abuses. The es-
tablishment of a permanent truth commission employing fair and open 
procedures would be able to create the authoritative and comprehen-
sive account of atrocities which is a necessary prerequisite for the 
healing process to begin. 
The establishment of a permanent international truth commission 
would have many advantages over the current ad hoc approach. By 
virtue of its international structure, it would be seen as more impartial 
and independent than nationally created commissions. As a perma-
nent commission it would have greater resources, and could move 
much more rapidly than its temporary counterparts. Moreover, be-
cause of the continuing involvement of the international community, 
there would be a greater likelihood that its recommendations would be 
given serious consideration by national authorities. 
Truth commissions are most useful when they are an adjunct or a 
precursor to, rather than a substitute for, prosecutions. To that end, a 
and integrity of evidence-gathering because of its potential probative value before a 
court of law. 
Id. at para. 16. 
133. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 408-09 (noting that 
appropriate selection criteria might, for example, reflect distinctions based upon degrees of 
culpability); see also Press Statement by Justice Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor, Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Conjunction with the Announcement of 
Indictments (July 25, 1995) (describing strategy of targeting top leaders for prosecution). 
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truth commission must be careful not to interfere with on-going do-
mestic or international criminal investigations or prosecutions. In this 
regard, Cherif Bassiouni, former Chairman of the Yugoslavia War 
Crimes Commission, has suggested that "instead of creating an institu-
tion separate from a permanent international criminal court, why not 
establish a truth commission as an agency of the Court?"134 After the 
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal had been established, Bassiouni had 
similarly proposed that the -Commission be "folded into the Tribu-
1 ,135 na.
While the Yugoslavia War Crimes Commission was terminated 
when the Tribunal's Office of Prosecutor was established,136 there is 
precedent for imbuing a prosecutor with the additional functions of a 
truth commission. Consider, for example, the statutory mandate given 
to Lawrence Walsh, Independent Prosecutor for the Iran/Contra inves-
tigation.137 Walsh was responsible for the investigation of the conspir-
acy among high-ranking Reagan Administration officials to divert the 
proceeds from the sale of U.S. arms to Iran to the Nicaragua Contras in 
violation of U.S. law. His three volume, 2,500 page report provided a 
comprehensive "account of the Independent Counsel's investigation, 
the prosecutions, the basis for decisions not to prosecute, and overall 
observations and conclusions on the Iran/contra matters."138 Similarly, 
the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Ethiopia established in 1992 
was given the mandate to create a publicly available computerized 
"historical record of the documentable abuses of the Mengistu regime" 
in addition to prosecuting individual cases.139 Although the statute ap-
pended to this Article envisages a stand-alone commission, its provi-
sions for jurisdiction, functions and powers, victim compensation, and 
134. Interview with M. Cherif Bassiouni, former Chairman of the Yugoslavia War Crimes 
Commission, in Brussels, Belgium (July 19, 1996) (on file with author). 
135. lain Guest, On Trial: The United Nations, War Crimes, and the Fonner Yugoslavia 90 
(Sept. 1995) (unpublished report of the Refugee Policy Group) (on file with author). 
136. See id. 
137. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 595(b)(2), 92 Stat. 1824 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2) (1994)) "establishes a stand-by mechanism for the appoint-
ment of a temporary special prosecutor when needed." S. REP. No. 95-170, at 1 (1978). Its 
purpose is "to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public officials and of 
the institutions of the Federal Government and to invigorate the Constitutional separation of 
powers between the three branches of Government." See id. 
138. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR 
IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS xvi (United States Ct. of App. for the Dist. of Columbia Cir., Aug. 4, 
1993). 
139. See Ethiopia: Report of the Office of Special Prosecutor, reprinted in 3 TRANSmONAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 559, 574. 
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penalties could easily be adapted and ii1corporated into the statute for 
a permanent international criminal court or of an ad hoc tribunal. 
Unfortunately, we are likely in the years ahead to see many more 
civil wars and itJ.ternational conflicts marked by grave human rights 
abuses.140 To paraphrase George Santayana, history's mistakes are 
bound to be repeated unless the international community can ensure 
through the development of a credible record that States learn the les-
sons of the past.141 The creation of a permanent international criminal 
court and a permanent truth commission could be the twin pillars of 
establishing such a record that can endure the test of time and the 
challenge of revisionism. 
140. See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993). 
141. See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN 
PROGRESS 316 (1953). 
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APPENDIX 
DRAFT STATUTE FOR A PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
The States parties to this Statute, 
Recognizing the need in the aftermath of international and inter-
nal conflicts for an impartial, fair, and authoritative record of grave 
human rights crimes and serious violations of international humani-
tarian law; 
Desiring to establish a permanent international mechanism for 
achieving such a record as situations arise; 
Emphasizing that such a mechanism is intended to be complemen-
tary to national and international prosecutions, not a substitute for 
them; 
Have agreed as follows: 
PART 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF TIIE COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY 
Article 1 
The Commission 
There is established an International Commission of Inquiry ("the 
Commission"), whose jurisdiction and functioning shall be governed by 
the provisions of this Statute. 
Article 2 
Relationship of the Commission to the United Nations 
The Chairperson of the Commission, with the approval of the 
States parties to this Statute, may conclude an agreement establishing 
an appropriate relationship between the Commission and the United 
Nations. 
Article 3 
Seat of the Commission 
1. The seat of the Commission shall be established at __ _ 
2. The Chairperson, with the approval of the States parties to this 
Statute, may conclude an agreement with the host State establishing 
the relationship between that State and the Commission. 
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3. The Commission may exercise its powers and functions on the 
territory of any State party and, by special agreement, on the territory 
of any other State. 
Article 4 
Status and Legal Capacity 
1. The Commission is a permanent institution open to States par-
ties to this Statute in accordance with this Statute. H shall act when re-
quired to consider a case submitted to it. 
2. The Commission shall enjoy in the territory of each State parry 
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions 
and the fulfillment of its purposes. 
PART2. COlV1POSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
COMMISSION 
Article 5 
Composition of the Commission 
1. The Commission shall consist of five members, indudi1'1g a 
Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson as provided in artide 8. 
2. The States parties to this Statute may temporarily or perma-
nently increase the number of Commissioners by two-thirds vote if 
warranted by the Commission's worldoad. 
3D The ComirJssion shall appoint an adrriir.t.istrative staff CO!lll!Ien-
surate with its worldoad, including lawyers, analysts, interpreters, sec-
retaries, security personnel, and investigators. 
Article 6 
Election of Com-missioners 
l.Each State party may nominate for election not more than two 
persons, of different nationality, who are willing to serve as may be re-
quired on the Coffill-nission. 
2. The Commissioners shall be elected by an absolute majority 
vote of the States parties by secret ballot. 
3.No two Commissioners may be nationals of the same State. 
4. Commissioners hold office for a term of five years and, subject 
to paragraphs 5 and 6 of tbis Article, are not eligible for re-election. A 
Commissioner shall, however, continue in office in order to complete 
the investigation of any situation which has commenced before the ex-
piration of his/her term. 
S.At the first election, one Commissioner chosen by lot shall serve 
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for a term of one year and be eligible for re-election; two Commission-
ers chosen by lot shall serve for a term of three years and are eligible 
for re-election; and the remainder shall serve for a term of five years. 
6.In the event of a vacancy, a replacement Commissioner shall be 
elected in accordance with article 6 to fill the remainder of the prede-
cessor's term, and shall be eligible for re-election. 
Article 7 
Officers of the Commission 
1. The Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson shall be elected by 
an absolute majority of the Commissioners. They shall hold office until 
the end of their terms as Commissioners. 
2. The Vice-Chairperson may act in place of the Chairperson as 
appropriate. 
3. The Chairperson shall be responsible for: 
(a)preparing the Commission's annual budget and supplemental 
budgets for the investigation of each situation referred to it, to be 
approved by the States parties to this Statute or the United Nations 
in accordance with article 12 of the Statute; 
(b )hiring and firing of the Commission's staff; 
(c)the due administration of the Commission; and 
( d)the other functions conferred on it by this Statute. 
Article 8 
Independence of the Commissioners 
l.In performing their functions, the Commissioners shall be inde-
pendent. 
2. Commissioners shall not engage in any activity or hold any offi-
cial position which is likely to interfere with their functions as a Com-
missioner or to affect confidence in their independence. 
3.Any question as to the application of paragraph 2 shall be de-
cided by the Chairperson, or by the Vice-Chairperson if it concerns the 
Chairperson. 
Article 9 
Excusing and Disqualification of Commissioners 
l.For good cause, the Chairperson at the request of a Commis-
sioner may excuse that Commissioner from participating in a particular 
investigation undertaken by the Commission. 
2. Commissioners may not participate in the investigation of any 
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situation in which they have previously been involved in any capacity 
or in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any 
ground, including an actual, apparent, or potential conflict of interest. 
3.Any question as to the disqualification of a Commissioner shall 
be decided by an absolute majority of the members of the Com.,_T.ission. 
Article 10 
Loss of Office 
l.A Commissioner who is found to have committed misconduct or 
a serious breach of this Statute, or to be unable to exercise the func-
tions required by this Statute because of long-term illness or disability, 
shall cease to hold office. 
2.A decision as to the loss of office under paragraph 1 shall be 
made by secret ballot by a majority of the Commissioners. 
Article 11 
Privileges and Immunities 
1. The Coilll-nissioners and the staff of the Commission shall enjoy 
the privileges, immu..nJties and faciliiies of a diplomatic agent \Vithin the 
mea11i11g of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 16 
April1961. 
2. Counsel, experts and witnesses called before the CommJssion 
shall enjoy the privileges and iiumunities necessary to the independeni 
exercise of their duties. 
Article 12 
Allowances and Expenses 
1. The members of the Commission and its staff shall be paid a sal-
ary on an as when actually employed basis in accordance with the 
schedule annexed to this Statute. [The schedule is not included in this 
Appendix.] 
2. The salaries of the Col11l11Jssioners and then· staff and other ex-
penses of the Commission shall be borne by the parties to this Statute 
in accordance with the annexed schedule or, in any case referred to the 
Commission by the Security Council, by the United Nations. 
3. The Commission is authorized to accept voluntary contributions 
from interested States, including funds, materials, and personnel. 
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Working Languages 
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The working languages of the Commission shall be English and 
the language of the State which is the subject of an investigation. 
Article 14 
Rules of the Commission 
1. The Commission may by an absolute majority make rules for the 
functioning of the Commission, the conduct of investigations, and any 
other matter which is necessary for the. implementation of this Statute. 
2. The initial Rules of the Commission shall be drafted by the 
Commissioners within six months of the first elections for the Commis-
sion, and be submitted to a conference of States parties for approval. 
Subsequently, additional Rules or amendments to the Rules shall be 
transmitted to States parties to this Statute and are considered to be 
approved unless, within six months after transmission, a majority of the 
States parties have communicated in writing their objections. A pro-
posed rule will apply provisionally pending the expiration of the six-
month period. 
PART 3. JURISDICTION OF THE COivfivHSSION 
Article 15 
Situations Within the Jurisdiction of the Commission 
The Commission has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute 
with respect to situations involving the following international crimes: 
(a)the crime of genocide; 
(b)serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in interna-
tional and internal armed conflict; and 
( c )crimes against humanity, including enforced disappearances, ex-
tra-legal executions and acts of torture. 
Article 16 
Preconditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
1. The Commission shall exercise its jurisdiction over a situation 
with respect to a ·crime mentioned in article 15 if the situation is re-
ferred to it by the United Nations Security Council, or a majority vote 
of States parties to this Statute. 
2.In referring a situation, the relevant entity shall designate the 
dates and geographic location which are to be the subject of the inves-
tigation. 
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PART 4. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE COMMISSION 
Article 17 
FunctiortS 
1. The Commission shall have the task of undertaking investiga-
tions, making determinations, and issuing recommendations, with re-
spect to situations within its jurisdiction in accordance with articles 15 
and 16. 
2. The Commission's proceedings shall be held in public and open 
to the media, except as required for the protection of victims and wit-
nesses or confidential information. 
3. The Commission shall presentits findings and recommendations 
in a final report in English and the official language of the country in 
question, which shall: · 
(a)be submitted within one year of the conferral of jurisdiction over 
a situation, unless extraordinary circumstances make a longer pe-
riod necessary; 
(b)be adopted unanimously if possible, otherwise by a majority of 
its Members; 
(c)include an analysis of the nature and extent of violations, how 
they were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, and 
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence the names of persons 
primarily responsible for violations; 
( d)include recommendations as to individual victim compensation; 
(e)include recommendations as to appropriate non-criminal penal-
ties for perpetrators including partial or complete forfeiture of gov-
ernment pensions and temporary or permanent bans from military 
or public office; 
(f)include recommendations as to steps that will help avoid a repeat 
of such atrocities in the future; and 
(g)be transmitted to the authorities in the relevant State, the media, 
as 'vVell as to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
take steps to ensure its widespread public dissemination. 
4. The Commission may, at its discretion, bring individual cases to 
the attention of relevant national or international judicial authorities. 
5. The Commission will endeavor to conduct its investigations so as 
not to interfere with ongoing domestic or international criminal inves-
tigations and/or prosecutions. 
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For the purposes of the investigation, the Commission shall have 
the power to: 
(a)gather, by the means it deems appropriate, any information or 
evidence it considers relevant to its mandate. 
(b )interview any individuals, groups or members of organizations 
or institutions. 
( c )hear testimony of victims, witnesses, and other relevant parties. 
(d)employ measures for the protection of victims and witnesses, in-
cluding such means as 
(i)expunging names and identifying information from the 
Commission's Report; 
(ii)giving of testimony through image- and voice-altering de-
vices or closed circuit television; and 
(iii) assignment of a pseudonym; and 
(e)carry out any other measures or inquiries which it considers use-
ful to the performance of its mandate, including requesting reports, 
records, and documents from the relevant State authorities or 
making on-site inspections. 
Article 19 
Rights of Persons Adversely Affected 
A person who in the opinion of the Commission is likely to be ad-
versely affected by the evidence given before the Commission shall re-
ceive an opportunity to be heard in person or through a representative 
and to cross-examine the person giving such evidence. 
PART 5. OBLIGATIONS OF STATES 
Article 20 
Cooperation 
l.The States parties undertake to extend the Commission what-
ever cooperation it requests of them in order to gain access to sources 
of information available to them. 
2.In any case referred to the Commission by the United Nations 
Security Council, all States are obligated to extend the Commission 
whatever cooperation it requests of them in order to gain access to 
sources of information available to them. 
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Article 21 
Victim Compensation 
1. The victims of the human rights abuses within the jurisdiction of 
the Commission are entitled to compensation for loss of life, physical 
or psychological inj~ry, loss of liberty, loss or dru11age to property, loss 
of opportunity, and other injuries proximately caused by the abuses. 
2. The Commission shall transmit to the competent authorities of 
the State(s) concerned its findings that a victim has suffered injury due 
to the acts of a specific il!dividual or governmental entity. 
3. Pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or persons 
clai1lling tl:1rough him may bring an action in a national court or other 
competent body to obtain compensation. 
4.A fund shall be established for the compensation of victims, 
which \vill be given resources by the gover!l_ment of the State involved 
in the violations and by foreign governments, who are urged to allocate 
__ percent of their aid to that State for the victim compensation 
fund. 
5.When the assets of responsible authmities have been frozen in 
accordance with a Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter, States may release such frozen assets to 
the victim compensation fund. Such frozen assets may also be released 
pursuant to judicial awards for damages in favor of the victims of 
abuses against the responsible authorities. 
Article 22 
Penalties 
1. The State parties undertake to carry out the Commission's rec-
ommendations for non-crLminal penalties of persons found responsible 
for violations of the cri~mes within the Corrnnission's jurisdiction. 
2.In any case referred to the Commission by the United Nations 
Security Council, all States are obligated to carry out the Commission's 
recommendations for non-criminal penalties of persons found respon-
sible for violations of the crimes within the Commission's jurisdiction. 
